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In 2002, Congress established the Antitrust Modernization Commission to address 
whether the antitrust laws needed to be changed in light of globalization and rapid technological 
change.  This paper addresses that question.  Although the basic framework of the antitrust laws 
is suitable to deal with current economic conditions, the paper identifies several areas where 
antitrust can be improved.  The paper first examines whether the proper criterion for antitrust 
should be total or consumer surplus.  Then it identifies some key issues that need to be clarified 
and explains how they should be clarified.  Those issues include market definition, merger policy 
and the treatment o f efficiencies, the interaction of antitrust and intellectual property, 
exclusionary conduct, the right of indirect purchasers to sue, and the proper allocation of 
responsibility between regulation and antitrust.  
I.  Introduction 
In 2002, Congress established the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) to 
investigate whether the antitrust laws and their administration need to be modernized, especially 
in light of changes in the worldwide economy.  The topic of antitrust is timely because antitrust 
laws influence how firms compete and a significant policy question is whether antitrust is 
impeding economic growth driven by technological change and new products.  Congress was 
particularly interested in whether rapid technological change and globalization required new 
laws or approaches to antitrust.
1 
An analysis of antitrust doctrines and policy raises fundamental economic questions 
about what economists know and do not know about competition.  Do economists understand 
enough about the effect of industry concentration on pricing or on R&D that numerical 
guidelines make sense?  Do economists understand enough about abuses of the patent system so 
as to adjust antitrust policy related to intellectual property to minimize competitive harm?  Do 
economists know enough about some particular business practices (such as tying, one focus of 
the Microsoft antitrust case) that some practices should be outlawed?  Do economists agree that 
the emphasis on defining markets should remain a pillar of antitrust policy in assessing likely 
harms to competition?  Do economists have any basis for claiming that antitrust is beneficial to 
the economy?  Can economists fashion remedies for antitrust problems so that the remedies do 
not cause more harm than good?  These questions strike me as difficult ones and good ones to try 
to answer. 
Before discussing what I believe to be the most interesting antitrust topics, I begin with 
the general policy questions of what should be the objective of the antitrust laws and how the 
laws should be administered in order to achieve that objective.  Without this background, no 
sensible discussion of antitrust is possible.  I then turn to a discussion of some controversial 
antitrust doctrines that need fixing or, at least, some tinkering.  Specifically, I analyze market 
definition, the interaction of intellectual property and antitrust law, certain types of exclusionary 
conduct (tying and bundling discounts), and procedural issues involving economic matters such 
as damage multiples, the right to sue, and laws of contribution.  I conclude with a brief summary 
and suggestions for future research. 
II.  What Is the Objective for Antitrust and How Should It Be Achieved? 
A fundamental question for antitrust is “what is its goal?”  One early debate was whether 
antitrust should try to favor certain groups, such as small firms.  That debate was resolved by 
courts with the statement that antitrust protects competition, not competitors.
2  But what exactly 
does it mean that antitrust protects “competition?”  Should antitrust maximize consumer surplus, 
                                                 
1  The AMC is comprised of twelve members, eleven of whom are, or recently have been, 
practicing lawyers.  I am the sole economist.  The Commission expects to issue a report in 
2007 based on extensive hearings (available at its website, www.amc.gov).  My views do not 
necessarily reflect those of the AMC. 
2 E.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 508 U.S. 209, 224 (1993).  
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total surplus (total welfare), or some weighted average of producer plus consumer surplus?
3  
Despite the logic described below compelling the use of total welfare instead of consumer 
surplus, the antitrust laws of most countries focus on consumer surplus rather than total surplus.  
Canada and New Zealand are the rare exceptions in that they use a total surplus standard.  In 
Canada, there has been considerable litigation over the meaning of total surplus, with the 
outcome finally reached that the Canadian Competition Bureau can use total surplus in the sense 
that economists do.  In the United States, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission state that their focus is on consumers, but suggest that they may not challenge 
activities (e.g., mergers) that have unusually large efficiencies, even if some consumers are 
harmed.  (Merger Guidelines (1997) at  Section 4).  U.S. courts generally have not recognized 
efficiencies as a defense to antitrust activity that harms consumers.  I first discuss what should be 
antitrust’s objective, and then explain the subtle distinction between the objective and how to 
achieve it in a world with imperfect knowledge.  I conclude with the practical consequences for 
antitrust in such a world. 
A.  The Objective 
The proper objective of antitrust should be total, not consumer, surplus.  (See Heyer 
(2006)).  The reasons are the ones familiar to economists who do cost-benefit analysis—that is, 
the size of the pie is maximized when activities are organized efficiently.  By the standard 
theorems of welfare economics, we therefore know that activities that raise GDP can make 
everyone better off.  It is better to pursue policies that maximize GDP—and only then worry 
about distributional questions—rather than pursue inefficient policies.   
A proponent of the consumer surplus objective for antitrust commits at least two logical 
errors.  First, if only consumers matter, then a buying cartel should be perfectly legal and indeed 
should be encouraged.  Monopsony harm would not matter at all in antitrust cases because the 
fact that sellers are harmed is irrelevant under a consumer surplus standard.
4  Second, the notion 
that antitrust should focus on consumers, not firms, is premised on a false vision of who are 
consumers and who are firms.  Most transactions in our economy are between firms.  Firms are 
typically both the consumers and the sellers.  The image of antitrust protecting innocent 
individuals from evil corporate empires is misleading (though sometimes effective).  Moreover, 
firms are owned by shareholders, so profits do flow back to consumers. 
The use of total welfare treats all agents in the economy the same, showing preference to 
no particular group.  The use of consumer surplus shows preference to consumers over 
producers.  Once preference is shown to one group over another, it is a small step in logic to treat 
                                                 
3 There is a semantic confusion in the economic and legal literature with some writers using the 
term “consumer welfare” to mean total surplus, with other writers using it to mean only 
consumer surplus.  Posner (2001) and Bork (1978) use it in the former sense. 
4 I know of no proponent of the consumer surplus standard that endorses buyer cartels, or 
believes that monopsony is not harmful.  Proponents simply say that buyer cartels and 
monopsony are exceptions to the otherwise sensible rule of maximizing consumer surplus. 
The need for these exceptions illustrates the lack of a coherent logic for the consumer surplus 
standard.  
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different groups of consumers differently.  However, even if one uses consumer surplus as the 
objective, I think it is generally a mistake to distinguish amongst groups of consumers.
5  Every 
act of a firm likely harms some consumers and benefits others.  Consider an airline merger that 
will lead to a very efficient route structure but will also result in less service to some remote city.  
Most passengers are benefited, a few are hurt.  Even if one is concerned only with consumers, it 
is not sensible to stop such mergers if the benefits outweigh the harm.  Otherwise, every merger 
could be stopped if only one customer is harmed.  In fact, my experience is that government 
agencies do look at aggregate consumer effects, and courts typically do also, although 
technically under the Clayton Act, antitrust harm to any substantial consumer group could 
provide a basis to enjoin a merger.  Therefore, whether one uses consumer or total surplus, one 
should not distinguish amongst consumers. 
B.  Achieving the Objective in a World of Uncertainty 
Even if one agrees that the objective of antitrust should be to maximize total surplus, the 
question remains how best to achieve that objective.
6  It has long been recognized that the legal 
system involves costs.  Aside from out-of-pocket costs, there are costs of making errors.  If 
courts are unable to figure out perfectly which actions maximize total surplus, then the cost of 
the legal system must include not just the cost of mistakes on the firms involved in a particular 
case, but also the effect of legal actions on other firms who may adjust their behavior in response 
to the possibility of legal liability.
7  
The recognition that courts make errors means that one might want to adopt a legal 
process that does not tamper with what we think is generally, though not always, efficient 
behavior.  For example, we would not want the court to engage in a detailed investigation of 
every action of a firm to make sure it was behaving in a way to maximize total surplus, rather 
than engaging in some form of strategic behavior that harms welfare.  The reason is that the court 
might well come to the incorrect conclusion and then that could chill competition among firms 
wishing to avoid legal hassles.  A good example of this reasoning is the treatment of predatory 
pricing.  As long as price is above cost (let’s put aside which cost), courts do not intervene under 
our antitrust laws even though one can easily construct models of above-cost predation.  A legal 
rule that exposes firms to legal liability from above-cost price competition could stifle 
competitive behavior to the detriment of consumers.  Hence, courts choose a safe harbor for 
pricing that allows firms to escape legal liability as long as price is above cost.
8   
                                                 
5 The not-for-profit sector raises special issues which I abstract from. 
6 The inability of a court (or social planner) to costlessly figure out efficient allocations is 
precisely why economists advocate the use of markets. 
7 The antitrust laws are designed to preserve the process of competition because that process 
presumably achieves a desirable objective.  By specifying the objective, it becomes clearer 
what processes should be protected. 
8 Just as there is a rationale for safe harbors to protect actions that are unlikely to harm 
competition, so too there is a rationale for unsafe harbors (known as “per se” rules) to forbid 
actions that are almost always anticompetitive, such as explicit price fixing.  
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A similar logic applies to entry.  It is not an antitrust offense for a firm to enter an 
industry even when that entry reduces total surplus.  For example, suppose an inefficient firm 
enters a monopoly market.  Depending on the magnitude of the inefficiency, it is possible for 
total surplus to fall, but no one proposes that the antitrust laws allow courts to engage in such a 
welfare calculation in order to prevent entry.  Courts would have a hard time figuring out when 
entry does harm and would make errors.  Entry is so vital to competition that subjecting firms to 
possible legal liability for entry is unwise policy:  likely, it would chill competition so widely 
that the gain from those few cases where entry does harm competition (and the court can so 
identify them) pales in comparison to the harm from stifling competition.
9   
Figuring out what should be safe harbors for competitive behavior depends on judgments 
about how error-prone courts are and how vital the attacked behavior is to competition.  
However, recognition that the administration of any law, including antitrust, involves errors, 
emphasizes that the antitrust rules courts adopt should not require a detailed investigation of each 
and every action of a firm to determine whether total surplus is being maximized.  Such an 
approach ignores the costs of the (error-prone) process on non-litigants in addition to litigants.  
My own view is that markets are generally better than  courts at producing competition 
(Easterbrook (1984)) and therefore, for certain acts such as entry, pricing, and product 
innovation, safe harbors generally make lots of sense, even though there are numerous academic 
articles (including my own) showing the theoretical possibility of social harm from strategic use 
of these actions in certain circumstances.
10 
B.  Practical Implications 
As a practical matter, how much difference does it make if one focuses on consumer 
surplus, not total surplus?  For most situations, there is unlikely to be a different outcome 
regardless of the standard used.  The reason is that actions that achieve efficiencies should be 
expected to help consumers.
11  Even in those cases where an activity (e.g., a merger) would pass 
the total surplus standard but not the consumer surplus standard, we know from welfare 
economics that the firm engaging in the action has enough resources to pay the consumers to 
make them better off.  Indeed, some merging firms now undoubtedly go to their major customers 
and, by offering desirable long term pricing, eliminate the customers’ opposition to the merger.  
The danger with this policy of paying off consumers is that it can raise a host of bargaining 
games in which customers assess whether their complaint to a government agency could scuttle 
an entire merger, and if so, demand the total surplus from the deal.  If the government agency 
blindly accepts such customer complaints, then efficient deals could get scuttled because buyers, 
failing to coordinate their demands, behave opportunistically and collectively demand too much.  
Conversely, if buyers anticipate that their opposition will not scuttle the deal, then they accept a 
                                                 
9 See Farrell and Katz (2006) and Popofsky (2006). 
10 A clever theoretical insight (Lyons (2002)) is that firms choose which mergers to pursue 
subject to antitrust constraints.  The profit maximizing merger in the feasible set can differ 
depending upon whether consumer surplus or total surplus is used as an antitrust criterion.  
The empirical significance of this point and whether it suggests that consumer or total surplus 
is the better criterion is ambiguous. 
11 For example, see the evidence on merger efficiencies in Carlton and Perloff (2005) Chapter 2.    
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pittance not to complain.  If the government agencies rely only on the lack of customer 
complaints in deciding whether to approve a merger, then again, deals that harm welfare can be 
approved.  What this analysis does indicate, though, is even with bargaining costs, the likely 
small number of cases where using a consumer surplus versus a total surplus standard matters 
may be even smaller than it first appears.  It also illustrates that a government agency must 
examine why customers are (or are not) complaining (Heyer 2006).  
In assessing a merger, assume, as is commonly believed, that a government agency 
typically focuses on price effects over a two-year future period.  Suppose further that a fixed cost 
saving often is not considered as a benefit to consumers while a lowering of marginal cost is, 
since a lower marginal cost leads to a lower price, but a lower fixed cost does not.  The problem 
with this logic is that in many high-tech industries with high fixed costs and low marginal costs, 
the product cycle is more than two years.  Lower fixed costs today likely will lead to lower 
future fixed c osts, which ex ante are properly viewed as variable.  The future fixed costs 
influence whether to invest in R&D, new products, and plants.  By focusing only on efficiencies 
that influence price over a short period, a government agency runs the risk of failing to credit the 
future efficiencies, which will benefit consumers in the long run.  The fixed cost savings of today 
are the variable cost savings in the future for new products.  Of course, if one is estimating 
consumer surplus, one could (and should) estimate the discounted value of consumer surplus.  
Suppose, however, that is not usually done and instead, the government agency focuses on only 
short run calculations.  In such cases, focusing on total surplus even in the short run, rather than 
consumer surplus, will better encourage the government agencies to recognize fixed cost savings 
as a source of future benefit to consumers. 
A serious objection to total surplus as an objective is that it is politically unpopular 
because it is perceived as being less favorable to consumers than is consumer surplus.  I believe 
this populist justification for antitrust is based on false premises.  From the arguments I have 
made, a (short run) total welfare standard is more likely to maximize long run consumer surplus 
than is a (short run) consumer surplus standard.  This is especially so in a dynamic economy 
where new products are the greatest way that consumers benefit.  The public needs to be 
convinced that the criterion of (short run) total surplus is likely to do a better job for consumers 
than the current (short run) consumer surplus criterion.   
The most potent reason to support the consumer surplus standard relates to the 
monitoring of antitrust policy.  If an antitrust agency adopts a (short run) consumer surplus 
standard, then some monitoring of the agency is possible by seeing whether consumers are 
harmed in the short run by the agency’s decisions.  If instead one adopts a (short run) total 
surplus standard (or long run consumer surplus standard), it will be  more difficult to verify 
whether agency officials are achieving their objectives.  By eliminating the ability of a 
government agency to offset consumer harm with claimed producer efficiencies, a (short run) 
consumer standard limits improper government action in which, for example, a merger to 
monopoly is allowed because of claimed efficiencies that are bogus.  It is easier to see whether 
price rises than to figure out a change in profits (though even determining whether price has risen 
can be hard to do).  Especially in countries where the rich can exert strong political influence, a 
short run consumer surplus standard may be politically favored over any other standard simply 
because of the fact that the consumer surplus standard can be implemented in a more transparent  
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way than a total surplus standard.
12  Therefore, although the total surplus standard (when 
correctly administered) is superior to the consumer surplus standard, paradoxically, 
implementation of the consumer surplus standard in countries where j udges or government 
agencies will be susceptible to political influence may lead to higher total welfare than 
implementation of a total surplus standard.  
Let me now turn to a discussion of some of the controversial topics in antitrust. 
III.  Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?  
A.  Market Definition 
Market definition and the subsequent calculation of market shares remain central 
concepts that courts rely on to evaluate antitrust claims as to whether a firm or group of firms 
have market power, meaning the ability to price above competitive levels.  Although there are 
numerous subtleties in its definition, a market loosely speaking is defined to be all those products 
whose presence constrains the price of a particular product.  So, for example, if there are 100 
firms each of which sells one unit of a homogenous product, each firm’s share is 1%.  Matters 
get more complicated when products are differentiated (does a Mercedes compete enough with a 
Chevrolet to be considered in the same market?) and when there are additional firms that could 
produce the product. 
Economists’ interest in market definition is primarily driven by its use in antitrust cases.  
In the absence of the antitrust laws, economists would spend much less time discussing what the 
denominator of  a market share should include.  Instead, they would try to econometrically 
estimate demand systems to get a sense of substitution patterns amongst different products and 
then use that knowledge to estimate the effect of either a merger or some questioned business 
practice.  Market shares might be used, but if so they would be, at best, a crude first step in any 
economic analysis, though they are based on the correct intuition that with lots of roughly similar 
firms competing, market power should not be a serious concern, where market power 
presumably means some ability to price so far above the competitive level (usually taken to be 
marginal cost) that it raises policy concerns.
13 
My experience has been that the crude nature of market shares as a tool to analyze market 
power is well understood by government agencies and some courts.  But many antitrust offenses 
hinge on a finding of market power, whose determination is often heavily influenced by market 
                                                 
12 The same lack of transparency as attends a total surplus standard also attends a long run 
consumer surplus standard.  Moreover, monitoring decisions over long term periods is not 
only difficult but makes it hard to punish the original malfeasor at the government agency 
where employee turnover may well occur. 
13 How far above marginal cost should price be, to raise policy concerns?  What does the 
“competitive level” mean in an industry where only a few firms can efficiently exist because 
of scale economies?  (Good questions with no unambiguous answers.)  The answer to the 
second question, given by the contestability literature, fails because that literature abstracts 
from adjustment costs.  See Carlton (2004).  
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share.  For example, some courts use market shares as a screen at summary judgment to decide 
whether to allow a case to go forward.  It is for this reason that so much emphasis is placed on 
the concept of market definition, especially in cases involving a single firm alleged to have 
misbehaved.  The defendant can avoid trial by convincing the court that he has no market power.  
The economist probably would prefer to inquire whether the alleged misbehavior had an 
anticompetitive effect and, if it could (or did) not, the economist would explain why that finding 
should trigger dismissal of the case.  Given that courts are error-prone in deciding what 
economic evidence shows, a screen of market power based on a crude market share analysis may 
be sensible, though as we are about to see, it is in precisely such cases that economists’ ability to 
define a market are quite limited. 
If one is to use market definitions and market shares, are there any inherent flaws and, if 
so, is there anything we can do to improve matters?  There are three separate circumstances 
where the use of market definition merits discussion.  One involves multiple firm behavior (e.g., 
horizontal mergers), another involves single firm behavior (e.g., strategic behavior), while the 
third involves new technologies.  Only in the first circumstance is market definition immune 
from serious flaws, though even there, problems can arise. 
1.  Horizontal Mergers 
The Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission go 
through an elaborate and, for the most part, well-reasoned method for  defining a market.  
Basically, a market has the property that, absent entry, a monopolist of the products in the market 
would raise price by 5% above current levels.  Once the market is defined, one calculates market 
shares.  If two firms with large market shares merge, then there is a presumption that prices will 
rise from current levels (although this presumption is rebuttable—see Merger Guidelines at 
§ 1.51).  Notice that the benchmark is the current price, not some (unobserved) competitive 
price.  The question of how to define a market in a merger case is well posed.  Whether, or how 
well, it can be answered is another matter. 
One way to answer the question of what products to include in a market is to estimate a 
demand system for differentiated products.  These demand estimates can then be used to figure 
out what set of products have the property that a monopolist of that set of products could 
profitably raise price by 5%.
14  Given a market definition, one then calculates market shares to 
make inferences about the effect on prices of a proposed merger.  This is quite an odd sequence 
of calculations. 
Econometric demand estimation is sophisticated and often difficult.  But once estimated, 
it can be used in conjunction with assumptions of a particular competitive game (including how 
that game might change, though this is seldom done), to yield structurally-based estimates of the 
                                                 
14 Suppose there are several possible products.  Is the subset of possible products that comprise a 
market unique?  No.  Therefore, one must add some additional criterion such as minimum 
number of products to obtain uniqueness.  If products are not homogeneous, should each 
product’s price rise by 5% or should some index rise by 5%?  This question is not answered 
by the Merger Guidelines.    
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effect of a proposed merger.  Though there are complications and limitations
15 to merger 
simulation, it is conceptually well-founded on the underlying economic structure.  To go through 
a complicated econometric demand analysis—and then to base prediction from the effect of a 
merger on only a general intuition based on market shares—seems like using a jack hammer to 
bang in a nail.  A much better way of proceeding is to use the market definition to calculate 
shares and then relate those shares econometrically to price, using either a time series or cross-
section.  This traditional price-concentration study is a reduced form analysis, but as long as the 
endogeneity of market share can be dealt with, it can be a reasonable way to estimate the effect 
of a merger.  The effects predicted from a reduced form can be checked for consistency with 
results from the econometric demand estimations and merger simulation. 
One approach to market definition is to ask consumers to which products they would 
substitute if the price of the product under analysis were to rise 5%.  One can then consider all 
those mentioned products as being in the market.  Although this approach may be easy to 
implement, it is not equivalent to that in the Guidelines because the Guidelines include products 
in the market only if substitution to those products is sufficient to make unprofitable, say, a 5% 
price increase of the product under analysis, while the alternative approach ignores the strength 
of the constraining effect on price of the products to which consumers switch.  The fact that this 
approach is not equivalent to the Merger Guidelines’ definition does not seem to be well 
understood. 
2.  Non-Horizontal 
Aside from collective firm action, the antitrust laws in certain circumstances may deem 
as anticompetitive a wide range of single firm strategic conduct, such as vertical distribution 
policies (e.g., exclusive dealing, exclusive territories), nonlinear pricing, tying, and predation.  
Such cases are usually brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and are referred to as “bad 
act” cases.  There are usually two requirements for a violation:  1) market power and 2) that the 
“bad act” maintains or enhances the market power. 
Often, analysts try to adapt the Merger Guidelines to define markets in a Section 2 
setting.  The key adaptation is to the benchmark price—that is, the market is defined to include 
all those products such that a hypothetical monopolist of the products could profitably raise price 
5% above the competitive price (not, as previously discussed in the case of mergers, the existing 
price).  If one knows the competitive price, there is no need to implement the definition since the 
whole point of the definition and subsequent use of market shares is to figure out if price exceeds 
the competitive price.  But if one does not know the competitive price, this definition cannot be 
implemented! 
This dead end leads to the following conclusions.  One can retreat and use the existing 
price as a benchmark in market definition, but this leaves open the possibility that the existing 
price already reflects market power, which will not be detected if the current price is used as the 
                                                 
15 These limitations include reliance of a particular assumption about the game, assumptions 
usually of no market power in distribution and ignorance of any dynamic considerations.  See 
Carlton (2004), and Scheffman and Coleman (2005).  
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benchmark.
16  Alternatively, one can base market definitions on similarity of firms and say that 
with enough similar firms, price must be competitive, and there can be no antitrust violation. 
A further difficulty is that most Section 2 cases involve firms  selling differentiated 
products.  Should market power in such industries mean price above marginal cost or profits 
above competitive levels?  Since most firms have at least some market power in the sense that 
price exceeds marginal cost, presumably the deviation between price and marginal cost (the size 
of the deadweight loss would be a superior measure) should be significant if it is to trigger some 
legal decision.  But there is no consensus in the courts or among economists as to how large this 
deviation should be.  Maybe, then, the courts should focus on profits.  After all, the entry process 
erodes profits, not necessarily the gap between price and marginal cost, when monopolistic 
competition exists.  Yet, for courts to enter into the difficult calculation of economic rates of 
return strikes me as not generally helpful.  Too many assumptions and too many arguments about 
the relevant time frame and accounting issues are likely to make this analysis difficult. 
The difficulty of detecting market power in these “bad act” cases is even more 
complicated than I have described because the alleged “bad act” may in fact be used to improve 
product quality and appear in the short run to raise price.  So, for example, a standard reason for 
exclusive territories is to provide incentives to distributors to advertise and otherwise promote 
effectively, the consequence of which is to raise price (and maybe output).  Although one can 
design sophisticated tests of such a promotion hypothesis, the fact is that relying just on price 
comparisons with and without the alleged “bad act” fails to address the relevant economics 
because the “quality” (or marketing) of the good may not be held constant.  Economists are 
sometimes better at addressing the full consequences of an alleged “bad act” than in sorting out 
how to define a market in such cases.  Unfortunately, courts often rely heavily on market 
definition as a screen as to whether to proceed to a more sophisticated analysis.  It might 
sometimes be better to flip the sequence of analysis and first ask whether the conduct should be 
immune from antitrust challenges (even if there is market power), then (if it should not be 
immune), ask whether there is significant market power, and if so, perform a full analysis of the 
“bad act.”  For example, if a firm is charged with using vertical restrictions in a Section 2 case, it 
may be easier to dismiss the case by asking first whether the challenged vertical restrictions are 
so likely to be procompetitive that they ought to be permitted as a matter of public policy. 
3.  R&D 
One of the most difficult issues in antitrust is how to treat R&D activity in the context of 
market definition.  This topic is important because many mergers (e.g., telecom), and several 
                                                 
16 This possibility is called the “Cellophane Fallacy,” after the “Cellophane” case, United States 
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).  The government charged that du Pont 
monopolized interstate commerce in cellophane in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
and showed that du Pont produced almost 75% of the cellophane sold in the U.S.  The district 
court dismissed, and the Supreme Court affirmed, largely on the grounds that cellophane 
constituted less than 20% of all flexible packaging materials sold in the U.S.; however, the 
courts did not adequately consider the degree to which other flexible packaging materials 
constrained (or rather, did not constrain) cellophane prices.  
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recent cases (e.g., Microsoft), are in industries where technological change is key.  One approach 
is to define an “innovation market” consisting of resources devoted to R&D in the relevant 
industry.  This switches the emphasis from products to inputs.  This definition would perhaps be 
sensible if there were a clear connection between R&D (an input) and output.  But there is not, 
except perhaps in a few industries such as pharmaceuticals—where there is a describable 
timeline for new drugs being developed.  And, in that case, one is really identifying future 
product markets.  In fact, many innovations come from outside the industry.  Attempts to link 
R&D concentration to speed of discovery are on much less solid footing than the (already weak) 
empirical base linking concentration to undesirably  high pricing (see Gilbert  (2005)).  
Accordingly, the use of  innovation markets as a way to measure market power in industries 
undergoing rapid technological change has little theoretical or empirical support (see Carlton and 
Gertner (2003)).   
B.  Intellectual Property and Antitrust 
There is probably no more important topic in antitrust than its relation to intellectual 
property, especially given the dependence of growth on innovation.  Property rights in 
intellectual property are designed to create incentives to innovate.  Antitrust applauds the 
creation of market power through innovation.  The difficult tension arises when either there is no 
innovation or the intellectual property rights are strategically created or manipulated. 
The premise that protection of intellectual property necessarily fosters its development 
turns out to be false.  There is no question that protection of intellectual property is necessary to 
encourage innovation.  But too much protection can inhibit innovation.  The reason is that if, for 
example, obvious ideas are patented, then subsequent innovations that rely on these ideas will be 
forced to pay for the use of these obvious ideas, and that reduces the incentives to innovate.  
There has been much criticism of our current patent system (see, e.g., National Academy of 
Science (NAS) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) studies), especially with regard to the non-
obviousness standard which many have claimed leads to too many patents.  There have been 
several proposed reforms of our patent system.   
The antitrust laws have important interactions with the laws on intellectual property.  
There are several ways in which firms can strategically behave to take advantage of our flawed 
patent laws.  I discuss three:  settlements, standard setting, and cross-licensing.   
Suppose Firm A has a patent on Product 1 and Firm B starts producing it.  Firm B 
believes that Firm A’s patent is not valid.  Firm A sues Firm B.  The court adjudicates whether 
the patent is valid and infringed and, if it is, the court either can enjoin Firm B from producing 
Product 1 or can force Firm B to pay a royalty to Firm A.  Suppose Firm A—knowing the patent, 
in fact, to be invalid and infringed—says to Firm B, “Listen, let’s settle the lawsuit.  Why don’t 
you stay out of the market for Product 1, let me reap monopoly profits, some of which I will give 
to you.”  This “settlement” of the lawsuit involves Firm A paying Firm B, the alleged infringer, 
to cease to be a competitive force in the market.  To make matters worse, if a subsequent Firm C 
produces Product 1, Firm A can use any royalty received from Firm B as evidence of the patent’s 
validity.  This anticompetitive set of circumstances contrasts with an alternative set of 
circumstances in which there is a patent that is likely to be judged valid and infringed, but the  
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litigation costs (including the failure to resolve uncertainty quickly, which could, for example, 
adversely affect investment behavior) are so high that the patent holder settles by paying the 
alleged infringer an amount less than the cost of litigation.  Getting rid of this nuisance lawsuit 
may well be in the patentee’s (and society’s) interest under certain circumstances and it is 
unclear why such a settlement should be prevented.
17  Distinguishing between these two sets of 
circumstances can sometimes be difficult, but some progress is possible (see Lemley and Shapiro 
(2006)). 
Absent settlement and absent litigation costs, the entrant would earn some expected 
profits  ( )
e p p l p l = - + 2 1 1 where  l = probability that the patent is valid,  1 p = profits 
(possibly negative) from infringing sales, and 2 p = profits earned from valid sales.  It must be 
that the settlement terms leave the entrant better off.  To prevent consumers from being worse off 
in an expected sense from settlement, the courts could forbid lump sum payments and require 
that the only way to settle a case in which the patent holder provides terms of value to the alleged 
infringer is to require that the settlement terms stipulate only when the infringer can compete.  
For example, patentee A sues infringer B.  A is not allowed to pay B to stay out of the market but 
can settle only by allowing the infringer to enter at some time  1 t  (before patent expiration).  Such 
early entry will benefit consumers compared to no entry and will generate profits for B.  
Although not always a complete answer, this method of settlement does mitigate the use of 
patent settlements as a cartelization device, though the analysis has ignored litigation costs.  
There are now so many patents in some areas that firms find it hard to innovate without 
having their own patent portfolios, which they use to bargain with other firms who might claim 
that an innovation infringes an existing patent.  Such patent thicket problems are a result of the 
patent laws, not antitrust. (See, e.g., Shapiro (2001)). But even here antitrust can make a 
difference.  Consider two areas: standard setting, and remedies, when a patent is found to have 
been infringed.  
Some standard setting organizations wish to set industry standards that do not entail large 
royalties.  In the design phase, it may be easy to re-specify a product so that it avoids infringing a 
patent, but there are so many patents both filed and to be filed that it is not so easy to be sure that 
a particular standard does not (or will not) infringe.  In such situations, some firms have 
expressed a desire to agree in advance amongst themselves either not to charge a royalty or to 
charge a specified (small) royalty should one of their patents be triggered by the standard.  Firms 
have expressed concerns about antitrust liability for such arrangements because these activities 
involve collective action regarding pricing.  Courts should generally encourage such 
arrangements and use rule of reason as the mode of analysis in order to recognize the efficiency 
of such an arrangement, while preserving the ability to condemn an arrangement that is a sham 
                                                 
17 See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 
2005) (“the interchange of rights and royalties in a settlement agreement ‘may promote rather 
than restrain competition’ (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 170-71 n.5 
(1931))).   
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price fixing agreement.  The Department of Justice recently considered such a proposal by a 
standards development organization, and declined to challenge it under the antitrust laws.
18 
Now consider remedies.  Suppose A unknowingly infringes B’s patent.  Suppose A 
makes a trivial use of the patent, but it would take A one year to alter the product design.  Should 
B be allowed to threaten to shut A down?  Such a draconian threat will allow B to extract A’s 
profits for the year.  (It also will give B an incentive to encourage A to go forward initially 
without revealing B’s patent.  Recent patent reform legislation puts limits on such “submarine 
patenting.”
19)  Under the equitable relief doctrine, a court can use its discretion whether to allow 
exclusion or to allow A to pay a “reasonable” royalty.  This may be sensible in some 
circumstances, but there is a serious danger that courts could become regulators of patent 
royalties.  Limiting the “reasonable” royalty to a design-around period may be one way to 
mitigate this danger,
20 though one must be wary of firms like A failing to make reasonable effort 
to gain knowledge about relevant patents. 
C.  Exclusionary Conduct 
One of the most controversial areas in antitrust involves exclusionary conduct.  What acts 
can a firm with market power engage in without creating antitrust liability?  The Microsoft 
lawsuit is only one illustration of the wide-ranging scope of activities that can be attacked.  The 
controversy can be easily understood in the context of our earlier framework emphasizing type I 
and type II errors.  Many acts attacked as exclusionary (e.g., vertical restrictions such as 
exclusive dealing, exclusive territories, and tie-in sales), clearly have efficiency-enhancing 
properties, though those efficiencies may be hard to measure.  These acts can also have 
anticompetitive consequences under certain conditions.  But if it is very hard to identify those 
conditions, do we really want to create the threat of antitrust liability for what are normally 
efficient practices?  One reasonable answer is to have broad areas of safe harbors for permitted 
activity that is generally efficient or at least not likely to harm competition.  That is how our laws 
on predatory pricing work.  For example, although it can be shown that above-cost predation is 
                                                 
18 See VMEbus Business Review Letter (2006). 
19 The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, in combination with the Intellectual Property 
and High Technology Technical Amendments Act of 2002, made a number of reforms 
intended to reduce strategic patent-application behavior.  Among these were:  publication of 
applications 18 m onths after the filing date, except where the applicant certifies that the 
invention will not be the subject of an application in foreign jurisdictions where such 
publication is not required (35 U.S.C. §  122); and a change in the term of utility patents, 
previously 17 years from the date of issuance, to 20 years from the date of patent application 
filing (35 U.S.C. § 154).  These reforms reduce both the opportunities and the incentive for 
submarine patenting.  A further proposed Patent Reform Act is currently under consideration 
in the Congress. 
20 Curiously, the International Trade Court (ITC) also has jurisdiction to adjudicate patent 
disputes involving foreign infringers, though it lacks the ability to set a reasonable royalty 
and can only issue exclusion orders.  This jurisdiction derives from the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
of 1930, a piece of protectionist legislation.  (See Wall Street Journal, editorial, August 23, 
2006.)  
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possible (to deter inefficient rivals), such pricing is generally allowed because courts are (in my 
view, properly) reluctant to interfere with price cutting behavior, the heart of the competitive 
process.  Only if the price cutting is too unusual to square with rational profit maximization (e.g., 
price below cost), do courts investigate the antitrust claim further.  
Notice how this test carves out safe harbors and does not require a detailed look at every 
pricing action.  In contrast, some courts, economists, and government agencies have suggested a 
“no economic sense” or “profit sacrifice” test for any type of exclusionary conduct, in which one 
asks whether, but for a strategic effect on rivals, the action makes sense.
21  Although several 
proponents are sophisticated and would likely utilize the test reasonably, I am skeptical that one 
test can work well in practice for all the varied types of exclusionary conduct.  Moreover, the 
logic of the test cuts to the core of competition.  Firm A invests today in some activity that 
consumers value, to gain future sales from its rival.  That’s good, generally.  Yet, blind 
application of, say, a profit sacrifice test could condemn this behavior.  When application of a 
test cuts to the core of competitive behavior, it is dangerous. 
Remedies for anticompetitive exclusionary conduct can be hard to fashion, as the 
Microsoft case illustrates.  The difficulty of devising effective remedies does not necessarily 
mean the government should refrain from prosecuting such matters, because a liability finding 
likely would trigger private actions in which monetary damages could be awarded. 
One of the areas of greatest current concern in exclusionary conduct is tying and 
bundling.
22  Even though economists have a great deal to contribute here,
23 both courts and 
economic thinking remain somewhat confused.  The key issue is the distinction between price 
discrimination and harm to the competitive structure resulting in higher prices.  It is well known 
that tying can be an effective pricing strategy to extract consumer surplus.  This is even true if 
only one good, good A, is monopolized and all other goods are competitively produced both 
before and after the tie.  The simplest example is probably the one where the willingness to pay 
for A (e.g., salt machines) is directly related to the intensity of use of some competitive product 
(e.g., salt).  A tie will extract surplus from consumers of A but leave unchanged the shadow price 
of salt to others who have no demand for salt machines, assuming salt is produced competitively.  
Consumers of salt machines likely are worse off, producers are better off, and efficiency can go 
either up or down,
24 though the better the discrimination, the more likely efficiency will increase.  
                                                 
21  See, e.g., Werden (2006), Melamed (2006).  See Popofsky (2006) and Salop (2006) for 
criticisms of these tests. 
22 In a tie, good A can be purchased only if good B is also purchased.  With bundling, either a 
tied good or separate goods can be purchased, but combined purchases are offered on more 
attractive terms. 
23 For some recent articles on  tying and bundling, see Whinston (1990, 2001), Carlton and 
Waldman (2002, 2005), Tirole (2005), Nalebuff (2005), and Greenlee, Reitman & Sibley 
(2006). 
24 Posner (2001) notes that economists too readily accept that price discrimination can lead to 
efficiency.  The profits from discrimination induce the use by firms of resources to engage in 
it and by consumers to avoid it.  Such a use is a waste.   
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The antitrust laws generally allow a firm to set a profit maximizing price.  Similarly, they 
generally allow a firm to charge final consumers different prices.  Therefore, being opposed to 
price discrimination through tying is odd since explicit price discrimination generally is not an 
antitrust violation.
25  Firms should be able to produce products as they choose and should 
likewise be able to price them as they see fit.  It is hard to distinguish a rationale for allowing one 
but not the other.  Moreover, rules on pricing strike again at the heart of competitive activity.  
Therefore, for reasons explained earlier, I would regard all pricing activity dealing only with 
extraction of consumer surplus as falling in a safe harbor of protected behavior. 
Matters are quite different when the alleged exclusionary conduct alters the shadow 
prices faced by the market.  Consider a tie-in sale in which, in order to buy A, one must also buy 
B.  If there are scale economies in the production of B, then at the price equilibrium with firms 
that produce only B, the scale of the demand for B by those not wanting A could be insufficient 
to support B firms.  This insight, due to Whinston (1990), explains how a tie can alter industry 
structure for B and thereby harm consumers of B, who do not consume A.  It is possible t o 
extend this insight to a dynamic model to show how a firm like IBM or Microsoft can use an 
initial monopoly to maintain monopoly as goods evolve technologically (see e.g., Carlton and 
Waldman (2002)).  
This same logic distinguishing price discrimination from competitive effects would apply 
to exclusive dealing in which, if there are scale economies in distribution, the use of exclusive 
dealing can alter the competitive landscape by raising rivals’ costs (Salop and Scheffman 
(1983)). 
To illustrate the principles we have been discussing, consider the  LePage’s case.
26  
LePage’s makes private label transparent tape, as does 3M.  3M decides to bundle its premier 
tape brand (Scotch Tape) with its own private label brand.  LePage’s sues, claiming 3M is 
violating the antitrust laws.  The court agrees, since LePage’s, without a brand name comparable 
to Scotch Tape, cannot compete in the same way as 3M.  Although there are numerous flaws in 
the analysis
27 (e.g., no examination of the magnitude of the discount, whether  the discount 
stimulated sales), a key one is that LePage’s continued to exist, and therefore, the shadow price 
of private label transparent tape to non-3M customers was likely unchanged.  That alone should 
end the inquiry.  Moreover, although there may be limited circumstances where discounts are 
anticompetitive, general attacks on discounts are likely to wind up harming the competitive 
process, just as attacks on “unfair” price discrimination (e.g. Robinson-Patman Act) have 
inhibited competition.
28  
                                                 
25 I discuss below how the Robinson-Patman Act bans certain types of pricing.  While price 
discrimination is rampant in the economy, plaintiffs succeed in very few Robinson-Patman 
Act claims. 
26 LePage’s Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. [3M], 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
27 See Rubinfeld (2005) for an analysis. 
28 The reader might surmise that repeal of Robinson-Patman would be desirable, a position 
economic analysis seems unanimous on (e.g. Posner (2001)).  The Robinson-Patman Act was 
passed in 1936 in response to small firms complaining about large firms (e.g., A&P  
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When alleged exclusionary practices cause both efficiencies and competitive harms, the 
optimal policy is unclear.  It is easy to say that one should weigh the costs versus the benefits for 
each particular circumstance; however, this can be exceedingly difficult t o do.  I would go 
further and require that one consider the economy-wide cost and benefit of finding liability.  
Even if one does correctly find liability for one particular case, will the effect be to chill the use 
of an efficient practice in other circumstances?  If so, the finding of liability could impose large 
costs and the wiser course may be to not attack the practice.
29 
IV.  Mechanism Design for the Legal Process 
A system of law is not self-enforcing.  In addition to judges and legal principles, one 
needs to figure out how to create incentives for the law to be enforced.  This means that one has 
to answer questions such as who can sue, what damages are recoverable, who pays attorneys’ 
fees, and how settlements should reduce damages when some firms settle but others do not.  
Each of these questions involves economic issues about mechanism design.  We will see that the 
economic answers sometimes comport with the current laws, but many times do not.  Let us 
discuss each in turn. 
A.  Who can sue? 
A private party that has been injured by anticompetitive acts can sue and recover (treble) 
damages plus attorneys’ fees.  Under federal law, only a direct purchaser can sue, while under 
some state laws, indirect purchasers can also sue.  If a cartel of steel manufacturers raises the 
price of steel, then a direct purchaser is someone such as a car maker who purchases the steel 
from a cartel member, while an indirect purchaser is someone who purchases a car containing 
steel.  If there is an overcharge of $1 per unit of steel as a result of the cartel, then the direct 
purchaser who successfully sues receives $1, trebled to $3, as damages for each unit he has 
purchased.  Assuming there is 1 unit of steel per car, an indirect purchaser of one car would also 
receive the $3 if he is allowed to sue.   
In Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court decided not to allow the “pass-on” defense in which 
a defendant claimed that he was liable for only those overcharges that were not passed on.
30  So, 
for example, the cartel cannot claim that the overcharge of $1 to direct purchasers is not damage 
because direct purchasers responded by raising their prices to final car consumers.  The Court in 
                                                                                                                                                             
supermarkets) being able to obtain discounts from suppliers.  One of the requirements of the 
Robinson-Patman Act is that under certain circumstances, such discounts must be cost-
justified. 
29 The counter-argument is that the failure to detect and punish an anticompetitive harm will 
create incentives for additional anticompetitive actions, which also will harm the economy.  
An asymmetry favoring inaction arises if the potential for anticompetitive harm is less than 
the potential for efficiency harm, and conversely.  An assessment of the asymmetry requires 
an empirical judgment based on the strength of market forces to correct court errors of 
inaction versus errors of intervention.  See Easterbrook (1984). 
30 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).  
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Illinois Brick banned recovery by indirect purchases because a) it leads to duplicative recovery, 
and b) it is hard to track all indirect purchases.
31   
The federal system is logically consistent, but the interplay with state laws has created a 
mess.  Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have passed “Illinois Brick repealer” 
statutes allowing indirect purchasers to sue in state court, and several other states permit the 
same result by judicial interpretations.
32  Therefore, there is now duplicative (or more) recovery 
in certain states, separate state actions for indirect purchasers that arise whenever there is a 
federal antitrust suit involving direct purchasers, and duplicative trials. 
The logic underlying the federal law is that direct purchasers have the most knowledge 
about an antitrust harm and therefore should be given an incentive to bring suit, and this 
incentive would be diluted if their damage award were reduced by what they were able to pass 
on to indirect purchasers.  See Landes and Posner (1979).  The logic underlying the position of 
states that allow indirect purchasers to sue is that it is unfair that final consumers who were 
harmed too receive no compensation.  Moreover, direct purchasers may be reluctant to sue their 
suppliers, in which case there could be insufficient private actions and sub-optimal deterrence if 
only direct purchasers can sue. 
If the purpose of penalties is to create incentives for efficient behavior, then the first 
justification underlying the states’ indirect purchaser statutes is not relevant.  Moreover, the first 
justification loses sight of the broader incentive effect on economic behavior other than in one 
particular case.  Deterrence is valuable even if a harmed indirect purchaser receives nothing.  
The second concern is more serious.  For example, in the recent Microsoft cases, computer 
distributors that were direct purchasers brought no private cases.
33  In such instances, the failure 
of direct purchasers to sue leaves a void that can be filled only by agents acting on behalf of 
indirect purchasers.  This suggests that banning all indirect purchaser suits would lead to under- 
deterrence, but that such suits should be allowed only where direct purchasers have chosen not to 
sue.  A complication arises if only some direct purchasers sue.  In that case, only indirect 
purchasers purchasing from the non-suing direct purchasers should have standing to sue.  
Though this procedure itself has complications and may require new legal mechanisms to be put 
in place, it avoids the current flaw in the system in which indirect purchasers can collect 
duplicative recoveries and have duplicative state trials.  Finally, whether or not one resolves the 
current conflict between state and federal law, consolidation of direct and indirect suits into one 
trial proceeding to coordinate presentation and evaluation of evidence would be superior to the 
current situation where separate state and federal trials occur. 
                                                 
31 See  Illinois Brick Co. v . Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (indirect purchasers can seek 
injunctions, but not damages, under the Sherman Act). 
32 Cavanagh (2004). 
33 I served as an expert opposed to Microsoft.  
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B.  Damages 
Economics has a lot to say about optimal damages in antitrust cases, but it is largely 
ignored by the antitrust laws.  The economic theory of damages (see, e.g., Landes (1983) or 
Baker et al. p. 1040 – p. 1046 (2002)) shows that the optimal penalty equals the expected net 
harm imposed on society by the anticompetitive act.  This penalty will deter anticompetitive acts 
that lower society’s welfare, but will encourage acts that raise society’s welfare.  If all 
anticompetitive acts were detected and fined, the optimal penalty from, say, a cartel, would equal 
the lost consumer surplus from the price increase from cartelization.  Courts use the overcharge 
on actual purchases as a measure of damage and ignore the loss in surplus from purchasers who 
cut back or eliminate their purchases in the face of the cartel price increases.  In the absence of 
efficiencies, this damage award will deter cartelization.   
Under the Sherman Act, antitrust damage equals treble the overcharge, regardless of 
whether the anticompetitive act is overt or not.  For example, cartel activity is typically covert.  
A multiple of 3 is appropriate if we detect cartels only 1/3 of the time.  (As far as I know, there 
are no studies estimating this detection probability.)  In contrast, a firm’s decision to employ 
exclusive territories, or to use bundled discounts, to tie its product to others, or to lower its price 
are all actions observable in the marketplace.  Absent litigation costs and legal error, there is no 
justification for treble damages in those situations since the acts are observable to all and single 
damages (including lost surplus) are optimal.  This suggests the possibility that at least for overt 
acts t he current damage system over-deters by inefficiently penalizing acts that raise total 
surplus.  There is an obvious financial incentive for plaintiffs to fashion claims as antitrust 
actions in order to obtain treble damages when only single damages are otherwise available.  For 
example, contract disputes such as those between franchisee and franchisors are often brought as 
antitrust suits precisely to obtain treble damages. 
Complications arise when certain conduct such as price fixing have global effects, yet 
penalties differ by jurisdiction.  Following the Empagran case
34, the courts have generally held 
that purchases in foreign countries are not subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. antitrust laws.  
For example, if any sales made in or into the U.S. trigger antitrust damages because sales made 
elsewhere are exempt from U.S. laws and if there are no damages or other penalties available in 
jurisdictions outside the U.S., then damages recoverable in the U.S. (assuming those have been 
set optimally to deter domestic cartels) will compensate U.S. consumers but will not optimally 
deter an international cartel from forming.  (I am ignoring the impact of criminal penalties – both 
monetary and incarceration  – available in the U.S.)  Attempts to increase deterrence  by 
increasing the amount of damages that U.S. courts award in cases specifically involving 
international cartels would raise complicated problems of international comity in which U.S. 
courts would be viewed as interfering with the right of other countries to decide how to regulate 
their own economies.
35  These complications emphasize the desirability of convincing other 
                                                 
34 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
35 An additional complication arises because increasing damage awards can disrupt the operation 
of U.S. and foreign leniency programs in which government prosecutors grant a complete or 
partial reduction in government penalties to firms that reveal a cartel and/or that provide 
evidence to prosecute a cartel.  
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countries to develop and enforce strong laws against cartels in their own country, a direction in 
which some countries seem to be headed. 
C.  Contribution 
Most lawsuits are settled, not litigated to conclusion, but the threat of litigation influences 
the settlement terms.  Suppose that A and B form a cartel and raise prices by 10% on purchases 
of $10 million for an overcharge of $1 million which equals $3 million in damages after trebling.  
Each cartel participant is jointly and severally liable, meaning that either one or both (in 
aggregate) could be liable for the damage.  So if B has no assets, A would have to pay the full $3 
million to the plaintiffs.  Suppose B settles prior to trial for $1 million.  Under current rules, if A 
goes to trial and loses, A is liable for $2 million.  Knowing this, A would offer to settle for, say, 
$1.9 million.  But B would of course realize that if B settles for 1¢, then A would settle for $3 
million - 1¢.
36  The plaintiffs are indifferent to the split between A and B, hence plaintiffs would 
accept B’s offer of 1¢.  Realizing  this, A would bid for the right to be first to settle and, in fact, 
the equilibrium to this game is that both A and B settle and each pay $3 million (or a bit less).  A 
and B are stuck in a prisoner’s dilemma and the no-contribution rule creates an incentive for each 
to settle for an amount that in aggregate exceeds total damages.  This “whipsaw” effect is well 
recognized and leads to over-deterrence and quick settlements.
37  One solution would be to make 
non-settling defendants jointly and severally liable for only their collective market share of sales, 
though this likely increases the use of judicial resources since the incentive to settle will be 
diminished.  The AMC has recommended, at least preliminarily, such a change to the rule of no 
contribution. 
D.  Antitrust versus Regulation 
The interaction between antitrust and regulation has a long history with significant 
federal regulation of industry beginning with the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887) and 
significant antitrust laws beginning with the Sherman Act in 1890.  Antitrust and regulation 
represent two competing approaches to competition policy.  One is general, the other specific.  
History has revealed that regulation, even well intentioned, can wind up leading to inefficiencies 
as regulators with imperfect information set policies that are designed to please various interest 
groups.  Antitrust, when administered by judges not beholden to special interests and when 
guided by economic reasoning (as it has been guided, at least recently), has shown itself to be a 
valuable tool to promote efficiency.  The (developing) comparative advantage of antitrust over 
regulation has led to a decline in regulation and increasing reliance on the antitrust laws to 
control competition.  See Carlton and Picker (2006) for more details.  But antitrust is not good at 
setting prices or other terms of trade.  Judges are generalists and lack expertise to become 
industry regulators.  Antitrust is designed to let markets work when they can work.  But when 
markets fail—as in natural monopolies—antitrust is not a substitute for regulation.  Instead, 
antitrust should be used as a complementary tool in which regulation is confined to as few areas 
                                                 
36 Plaintiffs may want to reward the first to settle by accepting a low settlement, since the first to 
settle often provides valuable evidence against the cartel. 
37 See, e.g., Easterbrook et al. (1980), though their “whipsaw effect” relies on a different 
argument than that given above.  
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as necessary with antitrust covering the remainder.  In such settings, the issue of how firms in the 
regulated sector interact with firms in the unregulated sectors defines a boundary between 
antitrust and regulation.  The Supreme Court in Trinko
38 drew a sharp line:  Antitrust courts have 
no business in setting prices.  Where prices must be set by other than the market, then that is a 
task for regulators.  Moreover, with rare exceptions, there is no legal basis in antitrust to impose 
affirmative duties on a firm to deal with its rivals.
39 
The most interesting place where antitrust and regulation interact is where there is an 
“antitrust savings clause,” as in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Such a clause ensures that 
a regulated industry remains subject to the antitrust laws.  This means, for example, that the DOJ 
can challenge a merger between two phone companies, even if the FCC has approved it.  This 
clause limits the behavior of regulators.  Although regulation and antitrust are administered by 
separate agencies in the United States, this is not so in other countries.  For example, in 
Australia, the same agency responsible for enforcing the antitrust laws is also in charge of 
regulation of certain industries.  A good research question is whether regulatory capture is less 
likely when those who enforce the antitrust law are the same as those who regulate industries, or, 
more generally, whether market performance in such industries is better with a single 
government overseer than with two. 
Summary 
Antitrust laws affect the vigor of competition.  Their benefits are easy to see when those 
laws prevent cartels or mergers that will lead to price increases.  Their use is more controversial 
when the conduct of a single firm is at issue.  Delineating the boundary between acceptable and 
unacceptable single firm behavior continues to generate controversy, especially in the area of 
bundling and intellectual property.  The controversy depends in part on how one accounts for 
errors in decision-making and the effects of those errors on incentives to compete.  There is no 
comprehensive study that quantifies the benefits (or costs) of our current U.S. antitrust policy 
compared to other possible policies.  Although studies of individual cases abound, and are 
informative, these studies are not a substitute for examining the overall economic effects of 
antitrust policy. 
Although U.S. antitrust policy could be improved, perhaps along the lines suggested, 
there is no question that it is an enormous improvement over the antitrust policy of, say, 40 years 
ago before economics had much effect on many lawyers and judges.  A significant policy 
question is whether countries with relatively limited experience with antitrust (most of the world) 
will learn from or repeat our mistakes. 
 
                                                 
38 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004). 
39 The exception is Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), 
where the Court ruled it an antitrust violation for one firm to cease cooperating with the other 
when in the Court’s view the cessation of cooperation was harmful to competition.  Aspen 
Skiing is “at or near” the outer boundary of liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
according to Trinko.  For a criticism of Aspen Skiing, see Carlton (2001).  
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